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NEGOTIATIONS AND SANCTIONS

1. ABSTRACT
Based on economic and legal perspectives, this Article aims to
analyze how the World Trade Organization ("WTO") combines
negotiations and sanctions to ensure the implementation of its law.
While the Trade Policy Review mechanism ("TPR") at the WTO
deals with the WTO-compatibility of the trade policy of a particular member in question, the prevalence of such policies can be successfully challenged at the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") which
makes decisions on trade disputes between governments that are
adjudicated by the WTO. The TPR can play a major role in this
framework, providing developing and less-developed countries
valuable input on the WTO-compatibility of their trade partners.
This article intends to analyze whether any relationship exists between TPR findings and the outcome of cases lodged at the DSB.
To do that, this analysis uses an empirical method involving five
countries. Our sample consists of two developing countriesBrazil and India-and three developed countries-the European
Community ("EC"), Japan, and the United States. The Article
shows that many issues raised by the TPRs of selected members
have been successfully challenged at the WTO, as a result of which
areas of concern have been rectified in the subsequent period. The
Article concludes that while the WTO is clearly able to ensure a
satisfactory enforcement of its laws in national legal orders and to
influence national trade policies, the system still needs some improvement.
2. INTRODUCTION
Article XVI:4 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization ("WTO Agreement") states that "each [miember shall
ensure the conformity of its law, regulations and administrative
procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements." 1 This general clause is reaffirmed by special provisions
contained in specific agreements whose observance calls for the
adaptation of domestic law. All WTO members are bound by the
obligation to adapt their legal systems to WTO law. This obligation expresses the willingness to ensure that international trade
law is enforced effectively on behalf of those who have undertaken
1 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994).
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to implement it. At the same time, the obligation to conform is justified only insofar as its immediate object is to avoid any risk of
conflict between legal systems - the WTO system and members'
domestic systems, as well as serious disputes between the various
members of the WTO. In this sense, the provision in Article XVI:4
does not contain anything original since that is the aim of every international organization or of any entity that lays down rules
meant to be enforced by a particular social body. However, the obligation stipulated in the WTO Agreement appears quite different
incomparison to traditional international law since it presumes an
obligation to conform, and not just to take appropriate action, 2 as is
generally the case. 3 Above all, this "conformity clause" is consolidated by the implementation mechanisms of WTO law.
A major advantage of the WTO framework over its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), is that
its implementation mechanism is much stronger,4 which is absolutely decisive to ensure a high degree of efficiency for WTO law.
Through the WTO's dispute settlement framework, a violator
2 While WTO jurisprudence did not clarify Article XVI:4's exact meaning, the
EC has argued that "Article XVI:4 must be interpreted to impose requirements
with respect to domestic law additional to the requirements that arise already
from the substantive WTO obligations themselves. This is achieved if Article
XVI:4 is interpreted to stipulate a 'correspondence, likeness or agreement' between domestic law and the relevant WTO obligations." Panel Report, United
States- Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 4.370, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22,
1999). According to the EC:

[T]he terms "ensure" and "conformity", taken together in their context,
therefore indicate that Article XVI:4 obliges Members not merely to give
their executive authorities formally the right to act consistently with
WTO law, but to structure their law in a manner that "makes certain"
that the objectives of the covered agreements will be achieved.
Id. 4.371. In this case, the EC took the opposite position of the United States,
which defended a more restrictive approach to Article XVI:4 by arguing that it did
nothing but confirm the traditional sense of the rule pacta sunt servanda. The Panel
chose the EC's interpretation of Article XVI:4 when it held that "Article XVI:4...
not only precludes pleading conflicting internal law as a justification for WTO inconsistencies, but requires WTO Members actually to ensure the conformity of
internal law with its WTO obligations." Id. at 313 n.652.
3 Julien L. Chaisse, Ensuring the Conformity of Domestic Law with World Trade
OrganizationLaw: India as a Case Study, 15 (Centre de Sciences Humaines, Occasional Paper No. 13, 2005), available at http://www.csh-delhi.com/publications/
downloads/ops/OP13.pdf.
4 See PHILIP RAWORTH & LINDA C. REIF, THE LAW OF THE WTO 20-23 (1995) (explaining how the WTO is "intended to provide for more effective decision-making
and a greater involvement of Ministers in trade relations").
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country could be made to reverse its WTO-incompatible policies
once those violations are proved at the DSB. In addition, the violator country could be subjected to retaliatory measures if such policies are not replaced within a reasonable period. The present system is much more beneficial to developing countries than their
developed counterparts since the former do not always possess the
necessary bargaining power to force the latter to withdraw the
WTO-incompatible policies in question. 5 This implementation
mechanism is even more important since the General Council formally suspended global trade talks on July 27, 2006, following the
collapse of last-ditch efforts to overcome divisions on farm supports. At the present time, the enforcement mechanism has had a
decisive role in guaranteeing the functioning of the WTO system.
However, there are several loopholes in the system that might
prohibit the smooth operation of this otherwise apparently strong
process. 6 First and foremost, in order to lodge a case, one state
(say, a developing country) needs to furnish proof that a particular
policy in force in another state (say, a developed country) is inconsistent with the WTO. Most of the time, developing countries do
not possess the requisite legal and technical expertise to establish a
causal link between the policies in force in another state and the
losses incurred by its domestic industry. That problem does not
generally exist for developed countries. 7 The deficiency could be
bridged in two ways. First, a number of developing countries
could pool their resources together to address a common cause and
jointly move to the DSB.8 However, most of the time, developing
5 The first case submitted to the DSB illustrated this point, since it pitted
Venezuela, the plaintiff, against the United States. See Panel Report, United
States -Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29,
1996). A case like this, in which a small player opposes a big player, would have
been unimaginable under GATT.
6 For a critical view, see MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE'WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION - LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 43-44 (2003).
7 One example is the National Trade Estimate reports prepared by the United
States Trade Representative ("USTR"), which regularly publishes detailed information on tariff and non-tariff barriers in force in other member countries. A similar exercise is unthinkable for the average Latin American or South Asian developing country, however large its reliance on trade might be.
8 One example is the Shrimp-Turtle case, where India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and
Thailand moved against the United States together and eventually won the case,
although the Appellate Body reversed certain sections of the Panel's rulings. See
Panel Report, United States- Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998); Appellate Body Report, United States -Import
Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
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countries fail to do so. Second, if a basic database with the necessary information were available, developing countries could take
the issues from that source to establish proof of causation. Since
the WTO-incompatibility of a policy needs to be established in
front of the DSB, several WTO specialists have argued that the ongoing DSB procedure is extremely unfavorable to the interests of
developing countries. In essence, it severely weakens the working
of a "safety valve" at the WTO.
The TPR publishes the WTO-compatibility of particular policies
identified during debates between members organized by the
WTO Secretariat. It gives a lot of strong background information
to developing countries. It is another instrument to implement
WTO law, though it is more of a negotiation than a judicial process
like the DSB.
This Article contends that Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement
is consolidated by the existence of the DSB and TPR, giving WTO
law a high degree of efficiency. The first section highlights TPRrelated issues and explores various options for augmenting the effectiveness of the current system. The second section analyzes the
dispute settlement procedure, focusing on its capacity to impose
sanctions. The third section analyzes whether there is any relationship between the findings of the TPRs and the outcome of assessments lodged at the DSB by looking at five countries: two developing countries (Brazil and India) and three developed countries
(the EC, Japan, and the United States). 9 The final section briefly
explores some policy issues on the basis of findings drawn from
these examples.
3. ENFORCING WTO LAW THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS: THE TPR
CONTRIBUTION

The TPR was an early result of the Uruguay Round, established
during the negotiation period in December 1988.10 Later, Annex 3
of the Marrakesh Agreement placed the TPR on an equal footing
with other WTO agreements. The objectives of the TPR, as ex-

9 As of October 25, 2006, a total of 351 cases were lodged at WTO, of which
211 were lodged against these five countries. In other words, these countries
jointly account for 60.11 percent of the total number of disputes, thereby justifying
the selection of these countries for our sample.
10 For a historical perspective, see Jai S. Mah, Reflections on the Trade Policy Review Mechanism in the World Trade Organization; 31.5 J. WORLD TRADE, 49, 49-51
(1997).
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pressed in Annex 3, include facilitating the smooth functioning of
the multilateral trading system by enhancing the transparency of
members' trade policies." By the end of 2006, the TPR will have
conducted 230 reviews. The reviews have covered 130 of 149 WTO
members so far, representing almost 97 percent of global trade.
For this reason, the TPR is widely considered an efficient and well12
functioning institution.
3.1. Ensuring the Transparencyof National Trade Policies
As stated in the 2006 report of the Trade Policy Review Body,13
the TPR is directly linked to one of the most important WTO principles- the transparency principle, which exists because states, individuals, and companies involved in international trade have to
know as much as possible about the conditions of trade. The
transparency principle makes the conditions of trade clearer in
three ways:
(1) By enabling contracting parties to appreciate and evaluate individual trade policies/practices and their impact
on the functioning of the multilateral trading system;
11 Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement states that the objectives of the TPR
mechanism are:
[T]o contribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and commitments made under the Multilateral Trade Agreements
and, where applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, and hence to
the smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving
greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and
practices of Members.
Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 3, 1869 U.N.T.S. 480 (1994) [hereinafter
TPR].
12 See Mah, supra note 10, at 49-51 (reviewing the background of the TPR);
Sam Laird, The WTO's Trade Policy Review Mechanism- From Through the Looking
Glass, 22 WORLD ECON. 741, 754-57 (1999) (assessing the TPR). However, one
question has come into the picture concerning the development and use of
grouped reviews to spread lessons on trade reforms. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference of 30 Nov.-3 Dec. 1999, Appraisal of the Operation of the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 15, WT/MIN(99)/2 (Oct. 8, 1999) [hereinafter
Ministerial Conference of 30 Nov.-3 Dec. 1999].
13 "The TPR[] continues to be a valuable forum for achieving transparency in,
and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of [m]embers, thus contributing to the smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system. It provides a
forum in which [m]embers may openly discuss and provide an objective analysis
of each others' trade policies and practices," Trade Policy Review Body, Report of
the Trade Policy Review Body for 2006, 10, WT/TPR/W/36, (Oct. 23, 2006) [hereinafter Trade Policy Review Body Report 2006].
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(2) By providing greater transparency in and better understanding of the trade policies and practices of states;
and
(3) By demonstrating the lack of respect for any concessions.
These objectives are reached through different WTO policies or
institutions among which the TPR has an important place. Transparency is also ensured by the notification obligation required by
different WTO agreements.' 4 Notifications have been made with
increased regularity since 1994.15 However, "deficiencies in the notification to the WTO level can be supplemented though parallel
16
actions such as the Trade Policy Review [m]echanism reports."
Indeed, the transparency is at the heart of the reports, with the TPR
"maintain[ing] a liaison and tak[ing] an overall look at how things
are shaping... whether objectives are being fulfilled... whether
17
any Agreement, frameworks and formats, need any revision."
Of course, the TPR can be read in accordance with the obligations and rights subscribed by members under WTO law. The
scope of its review is wide since all of the sectors covered by WTO
agreements come under that review naturally. Furthermore, "reviews under the [miechanism should continue to take place, to the
extent relevant, against the background of the wider economic and
development needs, policies and objectives of the [m]embers concerned, as well as of their external environment." 8 The TPR examines every national policy adopted to check their compatibility
with the WTO agreements; implementation of WTO agreements
clearly remains one of the most important issues discussed within
the TPR 19.
This review is performed independently of any litigation and
its results have no binding effect. This function was underlined by
14 See, e.g., Agreement on Safeguards, art. 12, June 1, 1995, 1869 U.N.T.S. 159
(1995) (discussing "notification and consultation"); Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, art. 25, June 1, 1995, 1869 U.N.T.S. 40 (1995) (explaining
"notifications").
15 Mohamed Messaoudi, Harmonie et Contradictionsdu Droit de I'OMC, in BEN
ACHouR RAFAA & LAGHMANI

SLIM, HARMONIE

ET CONTRADICTIONS EN DROIT

INTERNATIONAL 291 (1997).
16 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 6.
17 KUMAR RATNESH, WTO (WORLD TRADE
FUNCTIONS, TASKS, AND CHALLENGES 71-72 (2002).

ORGANIZATION):

STRUCTURE,

Ministerial Conference of 30 Nov.-3 Dec. 1999, supra note 12, 3.
19 See Trade Policy Review Body Report 2006, supra note 13, 12.
18
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the Ministerial Conference, which is the WTO's top decisionmaking body. It states that the TPR:
had been conceived as a policy exercise and it was therefore
not intended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of specific WTO obligations or for dispute settlement procedures,
or to impose new policy commitments on Members. The
Mechanism should continue to focus on improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and commitments
made under the Multilateral Trade Agreements and, where
applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements .... 20
However, several members have had to revise their national
legislation to adapt to WTO rules in the wake of certain TPRs. For
this reason, the TPR has been analyzed as an "extended wing of the
Dispute Settlement Mechanism." 21 Even if the TPR issues no condemnation from the WTO, diplomatic pressure is sometimes so severe that a country will have to conform to the report, if only to
avoid a potential litigation. One of the consequences of such a review shows the interaction between the internal (i.e., national) and
external (i.e., international) sphere, significantly reducing differ22
ences in a way typical of the new international economic law.
3.2. Examining National Trade Policies
Over a period of time, the economic policies of all WTO members will come under scrutiny under the TPR. The frequency of the
reviews depends on the members' share of world trade. Indeed,
the Annex mandates that the four members with the largest share
of world trade (currently the EC, the United States, Japan, and
Canada) be reviewed every two years, the next sixteen members be
reviewed every four years, and others be reviewed every six years.
A longer period may be fixed for least-developed members. The
idea is to carry on a regular review of the import polices in major
import destinations so as to ensure minimum trade diversion.

20

Ministerial Conference of 30 Nov.-3 Dec. 1999, supra note 12,
supra note 17, at 42.

3.

21 RATNESH,

22 See Lafer Celso, Rflexions sur l'OMC Lors du 50?,e Anniversaire du Syst~me
Multilatiral Commercial: l'Impact d'un Monde en Transformation sur le Droit International Economique [Reflections on the OMC During the 50th Anniversary of the Multilateral Commercial System : The Impact of a ChangingWorld on InternationalEconomique
Rights], 125 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 933, 939 (1998).
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No matter what country is under review, two documents are
always prepared: a policy statement by the government under review, which constitutes the basis of discussion within the Trade
Policy Review Body ("TPRB"), and a detailed report (surely the
more important of the two), which is written by the WTO Secretariat independently. The reports consist of parts examining the
trade policies and practices of the member in question and describing the functioning of the trade policymaking institutions and the
macroeconomic situation prevalent there. The WTO Secretariat
report uses published material from national and international
sources, such as the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and the
World Bank, as its main source of information. The WTO document database is another key source, becoming even more important given the increasing volume of notifications that are produced.
Available, reliable national official data and academic publications
are also consulted, wherever possible and necessary. 23 Consequently, the report does not consist only of the answers of the government of the country under scrutiny.
The Secretariat report and the member's policy statement are
published after a review meeting, along with the minutes of the
meeting and the text of the TPRB Chairperson's concluding remarks, which are delivered at the conclusion of the meeting. Another appraisal of the TPR is supposed be done in the next few
years, 24 one that does not propose important reform to this institution- preserving a place for diplomacy in the development of the
world trade regulation.
Various issues relating to the working of the TPR have attracted the attention of the economists. Keesing has proposed a
number of reform measures to enhance the effectiveness of the reviews: (1) the need for focusing on recent policies from a historical
perspective so as to assess the continuity of the reform process; (2)
the importance of including comments on the credibility and sus6. ("In line
23 See Trade Policy Review Body Report 2006, supra note 13,
with recent practice, the Secretariat has attempted to reduce the burden on Members under review of providing responses by using, to the extent possible, alternative sources of documentation, including Members' official web-sites or other authentic sites on the Internet.")
24 See WTO Analytical Index: Guide to WTO Law and Practice-Trade Policy
Review Mechanism, http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/
analytic-indexe/tprm- 01e.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2007) ("The TPRB should
undertake a further appraisal of the operation of the TPR[] not more than five
years after the conclusion of the Third WTO Ministerial or as requested by a Ministerial Conference.").
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tainability of the reform measure undertaken as well as the inclusion of analysis of general global issues comparable with the country case study in the TPR; and (3) calculating a measure of the
overall protectionism extended to the industries in the country. 25
In addition, highlighting the need to enhance frankness, the Keesing study cautioned against adoption of an optimistic air by a
study group, whereby the group barely highlights the economy's
worst problems in an effort to encourage the country to move forward (often by saying what the country would like to hear).
Joseph argued that the TPR could be improved through three
channels: (1) the expansion of data sources and presenting newer
data series; (2) wider dissemination; and, last but not the least, (3)
better follow-up. 26 First, there is an urgent need to add the tariff
data collected to an integrated database and to construct timeseries data on protection from all available sources, which should
finally be linked with trade and production. Second, all protectionrelated data, after construction, should be distributed to all interested parties through the WTO website. Finally, the protection
data collected and constructed should be linked with databases of
other international bodies like the Trade Analysis and Information
System ("TRAINS"), the simulation module ("SMART"), or the
Global Trade Analysis Program ("GTAP"). In addition, an institutional mechanism should be set up with the goal of providing
technical assistance to least-developed members as part of a follow-up exercise of the WTO.
4. ENFORCING WTO LAW THROUGH SANCTIONS: THE
CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM

As explained in our introduction, Article XVI:4 implies that all
WTO members are bound by the obligation to adapt their legal
systems to WTO law. To that extent, any violation of a provision
in WTO agreements automatically implies a violation of the cardinal obligation of conformity enshrined in Article XVI:4. If a member does not comply with WTO rules, it may give rise to a dis-

25 See DONALD B. KEESING, IMPROVING TRADE POLICY REVIEWS IN THE WORLD

TRADE ORGANIZATION 26-33 (1998).

26 See Joseph F. Franqois, Maximising the Benefits of the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism for Developing Countries, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: A PRO-AcTIvE AGENDA 147-66 (Bernard Hoekman & Will

Martin eds., 2001).
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pute.27 A violation complaint will succeed when the respondent
fails to carry out its obligations under WNTO agreements, which results directly or indirectly in the nullification or impairment of a
benefit accruing to the complainant. The Dispute Settlement
Mechanism ("DSM") is an important tool to ensure proper implementation of WTO law.
4.1. Efficiency of the Dispute Settlement Process
One of the most notable features of Panel procedures in the
WTO is the provision of compulsory jurisdiction over a case
brought by its members. Indeed, the WTO establishes a Panel
unless there is a consensus among all members not to do so.
Therefore, a defendant state need not give consent to the establishment of a Panel any longer. If a member requests the establishment of a Panel, consensus not to establish that Panel is lacking
by definition. The Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU")
deals with any dispute arising from WNTO agreements, providing a
single set of rules for all disputes. As soon as a Dispute Settlement
Body ("DSB") has adopted a report, that report becomes binding
on disputing parties as a matter of international law. The losing
party must bring its legislation into line with the recommendations
set forth by the DSB.
A WNTO dispute settlement procedure is launched at the request of one or more complaining members against a defending
member. This process is entirely government-to-government and
is only available to WTO members in procedures against other
28
members.
The first step in that procedure is a consultation between the
complaining party (or parties) and the responding party (or parties). Before taking any other action, parties to a dispute must talk
to each other in an attempt to resolve their differences by themselves. If the parties fail to settle the dispute by the end of sixty
days, the complaining party 'may ask the DSB to establish a dispute
Panel. 29
27 A dispute arises when a member believes that another member state is violating an agreement or a commitment that it has made to WTO.
28 National trade laws provide a means whereby a private party can have its
complaint espoused by a WTO Member. See MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 6, at
44-51.
29 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
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A Panel is established to:
make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and
the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving
the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. 30
The Panel, normally composed of three individuals, 31 receives
oral and written arguments from the parties to a dispute, as well as
other third parties. The adoption of the report is a significant
change from procedures under GATT. Since negative consensus
can be broken by parties who feel that a report should be adopted,
the DSB automatically adopts the report of the first Panel unless
the report is appealed or there is DSB consensus against adoption.
The parties may appeal the report to the Appellate Body, who
may uphold, modify, or reverse the legal findings and conclusions
of the Panel. An appeal has to be based on points of law such as
legal interpretation; it cannot re-examine existing evidence or examine new evidence. 32 To that extent, the Appellate Body performs "a general function of guaranteeing the proper application
and interpretation of the law in case of disputes within the organization in the interest of all its members." 33 In a process similar to
that of the first-level Panel, the Appellate Body (1) accepts oral and
written submissions, (2) holds a hearing with discussion and questioning by division members, and (3) prepares its own report.
Once the Appellate Body has completed its report, it sends the report to the DSB, which adopts the report virtually automatically
through the "reverse consensus" process. The priority at this stage
is for the losing defendant to bring its legislation in line with the
zation, Annex 2, Legal Instruments -Results of the Uruguay Round, art. 4.7, 33
I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
30 DSU art. 11.
31 On the selection of panelists, see TERENCE P. STEWART & AMY S. DWYER,
HANDBOOK ON WTO TRADE REMEDY DISPUTES: THE FIRST Six YEARS (1995-2000) 96105 (2001).
32 DSU art. 17.6. See also Giorgio Sacerdoti, Appeal and JudicialReview in International Arbitration and Adjudication: The Case of the WTO Appellate Review, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 245
(Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ed. 1997) (explaining the appellate review process in
WTO dispute settlements).
33 Id. at 274.
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rulings or recommendations. 34 If the member that is the target of
the complaint loses, it must follow the recommendations of the
Panel or the Appellate Body report, which after their adoption
have become those of the DSB itself. As soon as the DSB has
adopted a report, it becomes binding on the disputing parties as a
matter of international law, and the losing party must bring its legislation in line with the DSB's recommendations. At this stage, the
priority for the losing defendant is to bring its legislation in line
with the DSB's rulings or recommendations. The defendant must
communicate its intention to comply at a DSB meeting held within
thirty days of the report's adoption. 35 If complying with the recommendation immediately proves impractical, the member is
normally allowed a "reasonable period of time" to do So. 36
4.2. Imposing Trade Sanctions as the Ultimate Tool to Ensure Proper
Enforcement
As underlined by Arhne and Brunsson,
meta-organizations have a limited ability to concentrate
their resources, as most available resources are typically
controlled by members. Negative sanctions often require a
stronger central authority than that possessed by metaorganizations, and the extreme sanction, exclusion, is seldom realistic. Positive sanctions require less authority but
more resources, and given the resource limitations of most
meta-organizations, positive sanctions of any importance
are difficult to mobilize. 37
With regard to the WTO, an alternative option has been selected since, if the losing member fails to act within this period, it
34 DSU art. 19.1. However, in situations involving "non-violation" complaints, the Member is not required to withdraw the measure. See Adrian T.L.
Chua, Reasonable Expectations and Non-Violation Complaints in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence, 32.2 J. WORLD TRADE at 27, 38 (1998).
35 DSU art. 21.3.
36 Id. On the question of what is a "reasonable period of time," see PeterTobias Stoll & Arthur Steinmann, W/TO Dispute Settlement: The Implementation
Stage, in 3 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 407, 407-37 (Jochen A. Frowein & Ruidiger
Wolfrum eds., 1999).
37 Gbran Ahrne & Nils Brunsson, Organizing the World, in TRANSNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF REGULATION, 74, 90-91 (Marie-Laure
Djelic & Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson eds., 2006).
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has to enter into negotiations with the complaining country (or
countries) in order to determine some mutually acceptable compensation-for instance, tariff reductions in areas of particular interest to the complaining side. Any compensation that is agreed
upon must conform to the requirements of the covered agreements, which includes most-favored-nation requirements.
If after twenty days no satisfactory compensation is agreed
upon, the complaining side may request permission from the DSB
to impose limited trade sanctions (i.e., "suspend concessions or obligations") against the other side. But if the sanction (in the case of
non-fulfillment) includes procedures for countermeasures, the
amount of trade sanctions must be authorized and open to arbitration. In fact, these procedures would be the subject of a new dispute relating to enforcement. The DSB should grant this authorization within thirty days of the expiration of a "reasonable period of
time," unless there is a consensus against this action.
In case of benefits suspension, the WTO allows the winning
party to suspend favorable treatment, or, in other words, retaliate
in case the losing party does not comply with its obligation at the
end of the "reasonable period of time." 38 The extent of retaliation
depends on the level of estimated trade loss due to the continued
application of WTO-incompatible measures. 39 In the case of European Communities -Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), the arbitrators stated that there are minimum requirements attached to a request to suspend concessions or other obligations.40 Indeed, the request "must set out a specific level of suspension, i.e. a level equivalent to the nullification and impairment
caused by the WTO inconsistent measure, pursuant to Article 22.4;
and.., the request must specify the agreement and sector(s) under
which concessions or other obligations would be suspended, pur38 Where disputes are between unequal trade partners, it may be counterproductive to resort to suspension of concessions as the last resort. The significantly
weaker injured member may not be able to hurt the defaulting party. The sanctions may actually harm the injured member more than the defaulting party.
Thus, the final remedy of countermeasures may in certain cases be ineffective in
fulfilling the purpose of inducing the defaulting party to comply with DSB recommendations. See JEFFREY WAINCYMER, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION LITIGATION:
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF FORMAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 659 (2002).
39 See Kym Anderson, Peculiaritiesof Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement 6-9
(Centre for Int'l. Econ. Stud., Adelaide University, Discussion Paper No. 0207,
2005) (discussing retaliation).
40 Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities -Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products(Hormones), 16, WT/DS26/ARB July 12, 1999).
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suant to Article 22.3."41 Countermeasures may be considered the
last attempt at gaining compliance. In the event of a failure to
comply with the initial obligations of conformity, despite all reminders and negotiations, the defaulting member will, as a last resort, become a target of countermeasures because such noncompliance is the very event justifying their adoption. It is only
when the illicit fact is noted that the ability to react to it can be
granted to the injured member, since "authorization by the DSB of
the suspension of concessions or other obligations presupposes the
existence of a failure to comply with the recommendations or rulings contained in [P]anel and/or Appellate Body reports as
adopted by the DSB." 42 This gives the member imposing authorized countermeasures the right to temporarily desist from respecting the conformity of its national law to the WTO agreement vis-avis the defaulting member. However, "[o]ne of the recognized
purposes of countermeasures is to induce the defaulting party to
comply with DSB recommendations." 43 Until the adoption of
countermeasures, everything in the WTO dispute settlement process converges in just one direction: ensuring the execution of the
WTO agreements and, consequently, the compliance of national
law with those agreements.
It must be pointed out that while setting up this dispute settlement mechanism, the WTO has made every effort to make the system one of a multilateral, judicial nature. As a matter of fact, the
mechanism is now comparable to a "quasi-judicial" system. The
dispute settlement process is entrusted to independent bodies similar to courts of justice (i.e., Panels that hear cases as primary courts
following an arbitral model and the Appellate Body, the final court
of appeal, which hears appeals of judgments delivered by the Panels). That those bodies are determined to rectify deviations in the
system is quite evident, especially when they specify time limits in
a stringent manner and strengthen the credibility of the process itself with their expertise, competence, and impartiality. All of these
demands bring about the high level of compliance required by the
DSB and Article XVI: 4.

41 Id.
42 Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distributionof Bananas, 4.4, WT/DS27/ARB (Apr. 9, 1999).
43 Decision by the Arbitrators, Canada- Export Credits and Loan Guaranteesfor
Regional Aircraft, 3.47, WT/DS222/ARB (Feb. 17, 2003).
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There is one snag: the obligation to conform to a DSB report
does not invalidate the conformity obligation in an agreement.
Even though the primary rule remains valid, only the compliance
ex nunc as of the expiration of the reasonable period of time after
the recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB is required.
The non-fulfillment of the initial obligation is invalidated by the
execution of the treaty, and there is no attempt to examine the reasons for its non-fulfillment. In other words, only the suspension of
the illicit act is essential. As the arbitrators have said, "[language
used throughout the DSU demonstrates that when a [m]ember's
measure has been found to be inconsistent with a WTO
[a]greement, the [m]ember's obligation extends only to providing
prospective relief, and not to remedying past transgressions." 44
In a strict sense, members do not have to answer for a breach of
its obligation; they are only expected to put an end to it. The action
of the defaulting state cannot be punished. In this regard, the arbitrators have said that "a countermeasure becomes punitive when it
is not only intended to ensure that the [s]tate in breach of its obligations bring its conduct into conformity with its international obligations, but contains an additional dimension meant to sanction
45
the action of that [s]tate."
However, as John Jackson points out, according to the treaty
the lack of conformity is supposed to be responsible for the damage. 46 Indeed, "[i n cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or
impairment." 47 In spite of that, the DSB does not take into account
the damage already caused and gives more importance to the future execution of the treaty in question. The defaulting member is
only expected to do what he was initially supposed to, but not at
the time when it should have been done in the first place, which is

44 Panel Report, United States- Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, WT/DS221/R (July 15, 2002).
45 See Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil - Export FinancingProgrammefor Aircraft, 3.55, WT/DS46/ARB (Aug. 28, 2000).
46 See John H. Jackson, InternationalLaw Status of
TO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to "Buy Out"?, 98 AM. J.INT'L L. 109, 115 (2004)
(explaining that the lack of conformity is accountable for the damage).
47 DSU art. 3.8.
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a principle of both domestic and international law. 48 As stated in
1928 by the International Court of Justice in the Chorzow Factory
case, 49 "the essential principle contained in the actual notion of an
illegal act (a principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals) is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed."
5. CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE: ASSESSING THE RELATION
BETWEEN TPR AND DSM THROUGH THE COUNTRY STUDIES

When selecting the countries used below, we tried to keep both
trade structure as well as current trade dynamics in mind. While
the EU, the United States, and Japan are three major entities in
global trade, the market share of Brazil and India has been on the
rise over the last decade. The total share of the selected countries
in global merchandise export and import in 2004 was around 58
and 62 percent, respectively, while the same for service export and
import has been 70 and 67 percent, in that order. The negotiations
in which our selections are participating were not ignored either.
The two developing countries are part of the G-20 grouping, which
is currently negotiating against the agricultural subsidization policies of the EU and the United States. In addition, all five countries
are part of the G-6 (along with Australia) discussion forum at the
WTO. Clearly, the current analysis would be an important step to
assess the solidity of the stances adopted by these countries at the
multilateral level, which would be helpful in appreciating their
bargaining strength as well.
5.1. Brazil
We reviewed three TPRs of Brazil undertaken during 1996,50
2000,51 and 2004,52 respectively. The first gives a picture of the Bra-

48 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 441-49 (6th ed.
2003) (explaining a principle of domestic and international law for defaulting
members).
49 Factory at Chorz6w (F.R.G v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 41 (Sept.
13).
50 Trade Policy Review, Brazil- Report by the Secretariat,WT/TPR/S/21 (Oct.
4, 1996).
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zilian economy in the pre-WTO period, while the other two focus
on the reforms being implemented as a part of Brazil's WTO commitments. In 1996, the Brazilian economy was quite closed, and reform was suggested in a number of areas, such as support measures for domestic exporters and the domestic agricultural sector,
provisions on compliance with the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"), and enhanced
transparency. In addition, Brazil's import regime was quite rigid,
characterized by a high incidence of contingency measures, the application of safeguard quota on textile products, and the presence
of a protective tariff structure and quantitative restrictions in
automobile sector, which was used to divert trade from nonSouthern Common Market ("MERCOSUR") countries. Apart from
the primary and manufacturing sectors, the extent of liberalization
of the service sector in Brazil was also questioned. Quite naturally,
Brazil faced a number of cases on its ongoing support programs,
the trade and investment regimes in its automobile sector, and the
provisions on primary commodities at the DSB in the 1990s. While
Brazil won one case concerning primary products, it lost another
case on subsidization, where its export-financing program for aircraft was challenged by Canada. The cases on the automobile sector were amicably settled as Brazil moved to a more open trade
and investment regime through the subsequent deregulation of
state monopolies and prices. The import procedures were significantly simplified through the implementation of SISCOMEX, a
computerized system for customs clearance. Also, the telecommunications and financial services were liberalized, a move that was
praised in the 2000 review. However, the 2004 review notes that
Brazil must continue its reforms by dismantling the remaining restrictions on tariff and investment barriers, increasing the usage of
contingency measures, and diminishing procedural hassles. Although there is an ongoing case on import procedures, Brazilian
policies are becoming increasingly WTO-compatible, as evidenced
by the fact that the complainants of the last few cases lodged
against Brazil at WTO did not insist on the formation of a Panel.

51 Trade Policy Review, Brazil- Report by the Secretariat,WT/TPR/S/75 (Sept.
27, 2000).
52 Trade Policy Review, Brazil-Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/140
(Nov. 1, 2004).
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5.2. The EC
We consider four reviews on the EC here, dated 1997, 53 2000, 5 4
2002, 5 and 2004,56 respectively. Although the EC is quite open to
trade and investment, partners have often criticized several ongoing sectoral policies. The 1997 review focused on the EC's tariff
structure and the high volume of support measures given to agriculture. The 2000 review came out with a much more critical outlook than the previous one, stating that the extent of actual trade
liberalization appeared to be quite modest. The areas with high
protectionist cover included the textiles and clothing sector (high
above-average tariffs, tariff escalation, and quotas),57 iron and steel
products, electronic products and chemicals (anti-dumping measures), agricultural products (high subsidies, high tariffs, allocation
and administration of tariff quotas, and complexities in the border
regime). The 2000 review closely analyzed the functioning of the
Common Agriculture Policy ("CAP").58 The validity of the review's analysis would later become obvious at the 2003 Cancun
Ministerial Conference. The review also addressed the very important question of market access. It said that:
The operation of the CAP had also been of concern, both in
terms of limiting market access on the EU market and the
spill-over effects on world markets of the heavy use of export subsidies. Concerns had been raised with respect to
the complexity and protective effects of the import regime
59
for agricultural products.
Certain countries have even expressed their fear that the policies focusing on "food security" are in reality trade barriers. Of
course, the EC answered this concern by underlining the fact that
53 Trade
Policy Review, European Union - Report by the Secretariat,
WT/TPR/S/30 (Oct. 20, 1997).
54 Trade
Policy Review, European Union- Report by the Secretariat,
WT/TPR/S/72 (June 14, 2000).
55 Trade
Policy Review, European Union- Report by the Secretariat,
WT/TPR/S/102 June 26, 2002).
56 Trade Policy Review, European Communities -Report
by the Secretariat,
WT/TPR/S/136 Uune 23, 2004).
57 Comments on EU policy in this field were made by Pakistan and India. See
Trade Policy Review, European Union-Minutes of Meeting,
46, 139,
WT/TPR/M/72 (Oct. 26, 2000).
58 Id.
25, 35, 39, 57-60, 63, 80-89, 107, 121-22, 129, 130, 134, 137-38.
59 Id.
221.
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there is a deep and growing difference between the EC market,
where consumers have high expectations for product quality, and
other markets where this is not the case, such as the United States.
It was in this review that the EC presented its conception of this
very controversial precautionary principle. 60
For the EC, increases in market access for non-agricultural
products and certain services were overshadowed by these policies. The 2002 review focused on a number of issues highlighted in
the previous review, such as high tariff barriers and agricultural
subsidization, the textile quota regime, increasing use of contingency measures, and standard-related barriers. Although the EC
tried to reform its tariff structure, procedural requirements, and
domestic support trends in agriculture, the 2004 review found that
the major problems faced by trade partners in the last couple of
years have been relatively unmitigated. The review focused on the
complexity of the tariff structure and the subsidization trend in agriculture, tariff escalation in a number of sectors, an increased use
of contingency measures like anti-dumping, and countervailing
and safeguard investigations. In short, the EC is moving quite
slowly on the track of reforms suggested by the WTO.61 Still further, a number of potentially WTO-incompatible policies by the EC
have never been challenged at the DSB (i.e., an initial complaint
has not been followed by a formal request for formation of a
Panel).
5.3. India
We consider two trade policy reviews for India, one in 199862
and another in 2002.63 The 1998 review was critical of the Indian
policies in force, including a complex tariff structure and tariff escalation, an overprotective import regime, the presence of indirect
subsidies, a lack of compliance with TRIPS, a lack of transparency,
and prohibitive licensing controls in various service sectors. India
was defeated at the DSB on a couple of issues in the early years of
Id.
185-86.
On the important institutional reforms lead in Europe, see Julien Chaisse,
Adapting the European Community Legal Structure to the InternationalTrade, 17 EUR.
Bus. L REV. 1615 (2006).
62 Trade Policy Review, India- Report by the Secretariat,WT/TPR/S/33 (May
3, 1998).
63 Trade Policy Review, India - Report by the Secretariat,WT/TPR/S/100 (May
22, 2002).
60
61
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the WTO. However, the extent of WTO-induced reform in the subsequent period can be seen from the fact that, while the fourteenth
case against India was filed in early 2003, the thirteenth case was
filed back in 1999.64 According to the 2002 review, India modified
a number of its policies by simplifying its tariff structure, completely eliminating quantitative restrictions, reducing export restrictions, modifying its TRIPS legislation, 65 and reforming its telecommunications, financial services, and infrastructure services
sectors. However, the 2002 review was still critical on three points:
(1) an increase in the use of contingency measures, (2) the persistent price and distribution controls for agriculture, and (3) a continuation of certain commodity-specific entry restrictions. While
no new cases have yet been lodged in the DSB on the second and
the third concern, the last three cases against India have been filed
on anti-dumping measures. The case filed by Bangladesh is an interesting one, since this is the first time a developing country has
moved against India at the DSB. In other words, the TPRs have
been quite successful in highlighting the WTO incompatibilities in
the Indian economy and, through case law, substantial reform has
been ensured apart from the reform measures undertaken by India
on its own.
5.4. Japan
We have four policy reviews of Japan, published in 1998,66
and 2004,69 respectively. In the 1998 review, various
Japanese policies, such as high tariff barriers, a restrictive import
regime, and stringent technical barriers, came under fire. Japan
2000,67 2002,68

64 See Julien Chaisse & Debashis Chakraborty, Dispute Resolution in the VVTO:
The Experience of India, in BEYOND THE TRANSITION PHASE OF WTO: AN INDIAN
PERSPECTIVE ON EMERGING ISSUEs 507, 522 (Dipankar Sengupta, Debashis Chakraborty & Pritam Banerjee eds., 2006); Julien Chaisse, supra note 3, at 141-42 tbl. 5.
65 Samira Guennif & Julien Chaisse, InternationalLegal System on Pharmaceutical Patents and its Impact on the South: Economic and Legal Analysis of India's Case, in

SANITARIAN LANDSCAPES IN INDIA

(Alain Vaguet ed., forthcoming 2007).

Trade Policy Review, Japan- Report by the Secretariat,WT/TPR/S/32 (Jan.
5, 1998).
67 Trade Policy Review, Japan- Report by the Secretariat,WT/TPR/S/76 (Oct.
66

17, 2000).
68 Trade Policy Review, Japan - Report by the Secretariat,WT/TPR/S/107 (Oct.
9, 2002).
69 Trade Policy Review, Japan - Report by the Secretariat,WT/TPR/S/142 (Dec.
17, 2004).
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lost three cases in 1995 on its tax procedures and one in 1997 relating to the import of agricultural products. The areas of discontent
increased in the subsequent 2000 review where, apart from the
aforementioned issues, problems in competition policy, government assistance, and allocation of the tariff quota regime were also
highlighted. However, a number of issues relating to the deregulation of industry, the rare use of contingency measures, and reforms
initiated in the service sectors were praised in the report. Although no case was lodged against Japan from 1999 to 2001, problem areas in its trade policy still exist. Although it praised the impartial government procurement system and the ongoing
regulatory reform, the 2002 review still pointed out that many of
the WTO-incompatible policies mentioned in the 2000 report persist. In particular, the agricultural sector remained closed and Japan lost a case against the United States in 2002 on that very issue.
Like the EC, a number of Japan's potentially WTO-incompatible
policies have not been challenged in the DSB, even by the developed countries. The 2004 review shows that while Japan's trade
policy is increasingly becoming WTO-compatible, some areas of
concern (e.g., high agricultural tariffs and standard-related issues)
still remain.
5.5. The United States
Five TPRs on the U.S. economy are reviewed for this analysis,
undertaken in the years 1996,70 1999,71 2001,72 2003, 73 and 2006, 74 respectively. In 1996, several U.S. policies, such as the rules of origin
requirement, stringent standard-related barriers, the textile quota
regime, and the increasing use of contingency measures, were
pointed out. In the 1999 review, the major sources of concern were
tariff barriers, technical standard-related barriers, agricultural assistance, and the slightly-protected service sector. As in the EC, the
70

Trade Policy Review, United States - Report by the Secretariat,

WT/TPR/S/16 (Oct. 21, 1996).
71 Trade Policy Review, United States WT/TPR/S/56 (June 1, 1999).
72 Trade Policy Review, United States WT/TPR/S/88 (Aug. 15, 2001).
73 Trade Policy Review, United States WT/TPR/S/126 (Dec. 17, 2003).
74 Trade Policy Review, United States WT/TPR/S/160 (Feb. 15, 2006).
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first four reviews noted that performance in the broad areas that
required reform had not changed much: increased use of antidumping, tariff protection for domestic industries, technical standards, government procurement, the use of unilateral trade sanctions, and continuance of export subsidies remained major areas of
concern. The reforms in service sectors and competition law were
not enough to compensate for the distortions already created by
the work of the policies described above. In all, U.S. progress in
addressing valid concerns over market access is not yet complete.
The last review - in 2006 - expressed concerns over the wide use of
contingency measures and standard-related requirements in the
United States.
The extent to which several policies in the United States are
WTO-incompatible is perhaps reflected in the fact that, so far, the
United States is the target of the highest number of cases lodged at
the DSB. Since the formation of the WTO, the United States has
had ninety-five cases lodged against it; it has lost thirty-eight cases
and won nine cases. In twenty cases, a Panel was not formed and
on four occasions, the Panels were requested to stop functioning.
On three occasions, the United States revoked its WTOincompatible policies. The major cases that the United States lost
include one on standards (e.g., for reformulated and conventional
gasoline or shrimp), various anti-dumping and subsidy-related issues (e.g., the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 or the Continued Dumping & Subsidy Offset Act of 2000), safeguard measures, and tax
breaks for foreign sales corporations. The case against Brazil regarding subsidies on upland cotton 75 brought concerns about U.S.
subsidization to the forefront. In this case, the Panel ruled that
various U.S. agricultural programs constituted illegal subsidies
under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, the Agreement on Agriculture, and Article XVI of the
GATT 1994.76
However, it must be noted that, even after it lost a number of
cases in the year 2000, no Panel has been formed for numerous
contingency measure-related cases against the United States. This
75 See Panel Report, United States -Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R
(Sept. 8, 2004); Appellate Body Report, United States -Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005).
76 See Eliza Patterson, The W0 Decision on U.S. Cotton Subsidies, ASIL
INSIGHT, March 2005, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/03/
insights05O323.html (explaining the importance and potential impact of the decision).
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suggests that the U.S. application of contingency measures needs
to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis rather than by following a
blanket approach.
6. THE OVERALL SCENARIO
In the final analysis, we present the outcome of complaints
lodged at the DSB under eight different categories, year-by-year.
In the first two columns, we show who "won" and "lost" in a particular case. We define a case as "lost" if the respondent loses at
the Panel (even if the Appellate Body reverses certain legal interpretations) since the imposition of a WTO-incompatible policy has
been proved. In the third column, under the header "continuing,"
we have combined two types of cases-cases that are undergoing
review and cases where the verdict is expected within a specified
time. The fourth column notes cases currently at the Appellate
Body and cases where the report has been circulated but not yet
approved by the DSB. The fifth column deals with cases where a
joint request was made by parties to a dispute for the suspension of
a proceeding after a Panel had been formed, which shows that the
parties are willing to negotiate on the alleged measure(s) in force.
The sixth column notes cases where no Panel had been formed,
which shows mutual discussion leading the respondent to guarantee the desired market access in order to resolve the dispute.
There can be two other possibilities in such cases. First, (in the
case of a developed country) the complaint might have been raised
in order to harass the respondent as a trade policy instrument and,
second, (in the case of a developing country) the complainant
might have lacked the necessary technical expertise to support its
claim and decided to opt out before formation of the Panel. In the
seventh column, we note the cases where a mutually agreeable solution has been brought to the DSB. In the final column, the cases
where the alleged measure was promptly discontinued after the
initial notification by the DSB are considered. We feel that an
analysis of this column is very important and is an area where extensive future research is possible. On one hand, it suggests the existence of WTO-incompatible measures in force and yet, on the
other hand, it highlights the effectiveness of the dispute settlement
mechanism.
The analysis for the select countries (as respondent) is summarized in Table 1. Having lost and won one case over the past decade, Brazil seems to have minimal trade-distorting policies. Most
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of the cases against it have either been amicably settled or the
complainants have not insisted on the formation of a Panel. Brazil,
like Japan, has not revoked any allegedly WTO-incompatible policy measures once a Panel has been formed. The EC, however,
shows a mixed trend. While Panels are not commonly formed and
settlements regarding disputes with the EC are often amicable, on
only one occasion did the EC revoked a WTO-incompatible policy.
India, on the other hand, demonstrates a classic case where it has
lost almost one-fourth of the cases brought against it while it has
failed to win a single case. India amicably settled a number of
cases where related provisions were proven to be WTOincompatible. Japan, however, has managed to win only one of the
six cases against it. Several cases lodged against it have either been
amicably settled or a Panel was never formed. However, having
lost thirty-eight cases, the United States has been a major victim of
the DSM from the TPR perspective. On three occasions, requests
have been made to suspend the Panels' provisions, and revocation
of the ongoing WTO-incompatible policies occurred, indicating
that such incompatible policies were present before the case was
lost.
The relationship between the TPR and the DSB becomes more
obvious with the help of Tables 2 and 3. In Table 2, we note the
year-wise breakup of the number of cases lodged against a member and check whether the issues in question had been highlighted
in an earlier TPR. If a particular policy was highlighted in the earlier TPR, we mark the corresponding cell. While the table shows a
gradual revision in the trade policies of the selected countries over
time, the persistence of the WTO-incompatible polices in the EC
and in the United States is obvious. Table 3, which looks at the
continuation of the WTO-incompatible polices (i.e., in cases lost at
the WTO) as indicated by subsequent reviews, makes the point
clear. One should note that we look at the policy in question, not
the measure in question. Here the focus of the analysis is on the
policy (i.e., anti-dumping provisions), not on the sector in question
(i.e., anti-dumping duty on shrimp). In other words, the analysis
seeks to determine whether a modification of trade policy in the
country under review is or is not taking place. It is clearly observed from the table that proven WTO-incompatible polices have
at times been revisited in the case of the EC and the United States.
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7. CONCLUSION

As a first conclusion, we would like to underline the fact that
the TPR can put pressure on a government at the end of the consultation given the fact that the "[TPR] of the WNTO is a weapon of enforcing discipline. It is an extended wing of the [DSM]."77 However, this seems to suggest that the TPR intervenes after the
dispute resolution, which is not the case. Actually, it intervenes
before the dispute resolution, as an attempt to avoid any litigation
with a combination of consultation and negotiation. Furthermore,
as is evident from the recommendations provided above, the problem in the TPR lies not in the evaluation process of the members
but in the dissemination and the follow-up processes. In fact, the
drawbacks in the follow-up process could be avoided if the dispute
settlement process works without any systemic problems, the
working of which is reviewed in our analysis.
Moreover, the non-observance of the primary obligation to
comply with WTO law does not entail a secondary obligation to
remedy the failure to act. Instead it triggers a secondary obligation
in the form of a reminder to comply with the primary obligation.
The defaulting member is thus asked to fulfill his initial obligation
without being held responsible for to remedy the consequences of
his illegal action. It is here that WTO law should take inspiration
from general international public law to develop its law of responsibility. However, even if the action of the defaulting state cannot
be punished, countermeasures are an efficient means to ensure the
conformity of national law with WTO law. Of course, the process
of DSU review is ongoing, but even now, debates are not yet related to the theme of responsibility. 78 Moreover, negotiations concerning other agreements (e.g., Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement, Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing, Agreement on Agriculture) have now captured center
stage. Yet as the developing countries participate more actively in
international trade and the dispute settlement system, the direct
impact of the DSU will only increase in the coming years. The
77 RATNESH, supra note 17, at 42.
78 The question on permanent panelists,

remand, amicus curiae submissions
and cross-retaliation are among the issues that may be addressed within the
framework of paragraph 30 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. See Julien Chaisse & Debashis Chakraborty, The Doha Development Agenda on Disputes Resolution:
An Indian Perspective, 5(2) AMITY L. REV. 8, 12-16 (2004) (discussing Doha's process
in reviewing the DSU).
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growing use of the DSU by India and other developing countries
supports this contention.
Finally, the paper generates additional questions for future research, some of which remain unanswered. One major issue for future research could be to disassociate cases lodged by developed
and developing countries against a particular member (preferably,
the EC and United States from the sample we have chosen) and
look at the results from that perspective. It is challenging to analyze the ongoing scenario and it will be very innovative to scrutinize the relationship between TPRs and the DSB in the current
framework. However, on the basis of the five case studies, we see
that, although there is a need to enhance the dissemination and follow-up of TPRs, the proceedings of the review reports could well
be considered as an extensively-prepared background note for developing countries. In addition, this exercise helps developing
countries much more than their developed counterparts. The focus
on systemic reform at the WTO should actually stress more reform
in DSB, the forum at which developing countries challenge the
WTO-incompatibilities of their developed counterparts. Although
the two systems have been quite "fair" in protecting developing
countries' interests at the end of their ten-year-long transitory
phase, developing countries are likely to come under severe pressure from cases lodged against them at DSB. Judging the future
from that angle, it becomes obvious that systemic reform in the
working of DSB and the dissemination of TPRs should be the major joint proactive agenda of the developing countries, in that order.
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Table 1: Summnary Result of Cases Lodged Against the Select Countries

Brazil
Year
A
B
C
1995
1
1996
1
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
1
2006
Total
1
1
1
EuropeanCommunities
Year
A
B
C
1995
1
1996
1
3
1997
2
1
1998
1
1
1999
1
2000
1
2001
1
2002
4
1
2003
1
4
2004

2005

-

-

1
-

D

E

F

G

H

Total
1

-

-

-

-

-

-

1
-

2
2

-

1
1

-

-

-

-

-

1

-

1

-

4

-

2
1
1

1

-

2

-

-

1

0

0
0
0
1
0
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-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0

0

5

5

D

E
-

F

G

H

Total

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

3

-

3
3
10
3
1
2
1
-

1

-

1

-

1

-

-

1

-

1

-

-

3
1
4
3
1
-

1
-

8
5
10
15
4

-

3

-

3

-

6
8

-

-

79 A -Win

B - Loss
C- Continuing / Result expected soon
D- Circulated but not approved by DSB / Case currently with Appellate Body
E - Request to suspend Panel proceeding
F -Panel not formed / Ongoing consultation among parties
G - Amicably settled
H - Discontinuation of the alleged measure by the respondent
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2
Total
6
15
5
India
Year
A
B
C
1995
1996
1
1997
2
1998
1
1999
1
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Total
0
5
0
Japan
Year
A
B
C
1995
3
1996
1
1997
1
1998
1999
2000
.2001
.2002
1
2003
.-..
2004
2005
.-..
2006
1
Total
1
5
1
United States
Year
A
B
C
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3
1996
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-

2
2

-
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1

2

-
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0
0
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-
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-
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-

-
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-

-

-

-

6

5

1

E

-

-
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1

-

F
-

3
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-

-

-

-

3

G
-

0

-

-1
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F

-

0

1
26

G
1
1
1

H
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-

1
2
1

-

4
4
3
1
0
0
0

-

1

-

1

-

5

0

-

0
D

-

-

0
E

-

3
F

-

G

1

H
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0
1
0
1
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4

1
2

2
4

1
1

2
1

8
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-
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1

-
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Table 2: Analysis of Complaints Lodged at the DSB and the Mention of the Issue at the TPR
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Table 3: Analysis of Cases Lost at the DSB and the Mention of the
Issue at the TPR
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